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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-102(2) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
a. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in granting 
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment based upon 
its conclusion that, as a matter of law, plaintiff did not 
breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
inherent in the contractual relationship between the parties 
when it failed to cooperate in providing Mr. Marin with the 
marketing tools which were necessary in order for Mr. Marin 
to meet his performance guarantees. This issued was 
preserved for review in Mr. Marin's Response to Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. (R. 0119) 
Standard of review: Review of the district court's grant of 
summary judgment is for correctness, according no deference 
to that court's legal conclusions. Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 
950, 953 (Utah 1998). 
Determinative law: Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, 20 P.3d 
876; Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950 (Utah 1998); St. 
Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 
1991); and Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 
(Utah App. 1994). 
1 
b. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in the amount of 
attorney fees awarded to plaintiff. This issue was 
preserved in Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed 
Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit. (R. 0499) 
Standard of review: The standard of review on appeal of the 
amount of a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent 
error or clear abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 
UT 81, 1127, 130 P.3d 325 (citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998)). 
Determinative law: Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 
325; Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 54 (Utah 1998); Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); and Gardner v. 
Madsen, 949 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1997). 
c. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in awarding to 
plaintiff as "costs'7 its expenditures for photocopies, 
overnight mail, courier, postage, online research, etc. 
This issue was preserved in Defendant's Objection to 
Plaintiff's Proposed Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit. (R. 
0499) 
Standard of review: A trial court's decision to award the 
prevailing party costs is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Jensen v. Sawyers, 205 UT 81, 1 140, 
130 P.3d 325 (citing Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, % 4, 16 
P.3d 549). 
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Determinative law: Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda 
and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from final orders of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County. 
II. Statement of Facts 
1. Plaintiff is in the business of manufacturing and selling 
therapeutic grade essential oils and wellness supplements. 
Historically, plaintiff has sold its products through a network 
of individuals who are for the most part practitioners of 
alternative medicine, massage therapists, and quasi-naturopath 
non-licensed wellness enthusiasts. When plaintiff's 
representatives first contacted Mr. Marin, they represented to 
Mr. Marin that they desired to increase their company's sales 
volume using a mainstream network marketing model, i.e., 
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marketing their products through traditional network marketing 
sales representatives directly to the individual consumer. 
Plaintiff's representatives were aware of the fact that Mr. Marjn 
had previously built a global network of more than 500,000 
distributors for Amway Corporation using a mainstream network 
marketing model. (R. 0126) 
2. The parties entered into a Field Advisor to Executive 
Board Distributor Agreement on January 12, 2005 (hereinafter the 
NXAgreement") . (R. 0090) 
3. Paragraph 18 of the Agreement provides that u:here are no 
representations, warranties, or other agreements between the 
Parties in connection with the subject matter hereof except as 
specifically set forth herein." (R. 0032) 
4. Under paragraph 4 of the Agreement, plaintiff agreed to 
pay Mr. Marin advance payments of: 
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005); 
$25,000 on 15 February 2005; 
$25,000 on 15 March 2005; and 
$25,000 on 15 April 2005. 
(R. 0089) 
5. Under paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement, Mr. Marin agreed 
that he would meet the following performance guarantees of 
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the specified dates: 
$5,000 by 15 February 2005; 
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$30,000 by 15 March 2005; 
$100,000 by 15 April 2005; 
$300,000 by 15 May 2005; 
$600,000 by 15 June 2005; and 
$900,000 by 15 July 2005. 
(R. 0089) 
6. Paragraph 6.1 of the Agreement provides for Mr. Marin's 
payment of plaintiff's "legal fees" arising from "contravention 
... of any of the terms and conditions imposed on [Mr. Marin] 
pursuant to this Agreement." (R. 0085) 
7. On January 12, 2005, in connection with the execution of 
the Agreement, plaintiff paid a $25,000 advance to Mr. Marin. 
(R. 0368) 
8. By February 15, 2005, Mr. Marin met his $5,000 cumulative 
"auto ship" sales volume performance guarantee under paragraph 
3.4 of the Agreement; (R. 0368) 
9. Accordingly, on February 15, 2005, plaintiff paid Mr. 
Marin another $25,000 advance. (R. 0368) 
10. Mr. Marin was unable to meet his $30, 000 cumulative auto 
ship sales volume performance guarantee by March 15, 2005 in 
accordance with paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement. (R. 0368) 
11. On March 15, 2005, plaintiff paid Mr. Marin another 
$15,000 advance. (R. 0368) 
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12. Mr. Marin was unable to meet his April 15, 2005 
performance guarantee by April 15, 2005. (R. 0368) 
13. As part of its pitch to induce Mr. Marin to enter into 
the Agreement, plaintiff represented to Mr. Marin that plaintiff 
was nearing completion of a new mainstream marketing website, 
recruiting DVD, audio CD, and other marketing materials 
(hereinafter referred to as the ''marketing tools") . It was 
clearly understood by both plaintiff and Mr. Marin that -these 
marketing tools would be absolutely necessary in order for Mr. 
Marin to be able to meet his performance guarantees under the 
Agreement and it was represented to Mr. Marin that they would be 
available for use by February 1, 2005. No experienced leader in 
the irdustry would agree to the performance guarantees without 
having these marketing tools. (R. 0126-0125) 
14. Unfortunately, while plaintiff repeatedly promised to do 
so, plaintiff failed to provide Mr. Marin with any of the 
necessary marketing tools (except for one mediocre but expensive 
brochure which Mr. Marin's distributors were not interested in 
purchasing). After plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing 
tools by February 1, 2005, as promised, Mr. Marin spent more than 
a month working on his own and in conjunction with the third 
party vendor hired by plaintiff, Rainmaker Consulting Group, in 
order expedite the delivery of the marketing tools. Mr. Marin 
wrote more than 20 marketing and training scripts for video and 
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web based content. On two occasions, Mr. Mann traveled to St. 
Augustine, Florida to v/ork with Rainmaker Consulting shooting 
marketing videos. To Mr. Marin's knowledge, the videos have 
never been completed. (R. 0125) 
15. It was only based upon plaintiff's representations and 
the parties' mutual understanding that these marketing tools we^e 
almost ready and would be provided in a timely manner, that Mr. 
Mann agreed to the pei formance guarantees contained in paragraph 
3.4 of the Agreement. Witnout the marketing tools there was 
virtually no possibility that Mr. Marin could have met his 
performance guarantees. (R. 0125) 
16. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed to 
proviae the marketing tools as promised, Mr. Marin contacted Gary 
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David Stirling, 
plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with his growing concerns 
about his ability to meet his performance guarantees. Mr. Young 
and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to 
perform as promised, assured Mr. Marin that his inability to 
satisfy his performance guarantees would not affect his receipt 
of the advance payment of $25,000 due February 15, 2005, and 
expressed their confidence that the marketing tools would be 
ready for Mr. Marin's use by mid-February to early March 2005. 
(R. 0125-0124) 
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17. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley, plaintiff's 
Chief Financial Officei, informed Mr. Marin that cue to Mr. 
Marin's failure to meet his March 15, 2005, performance 
guarantee, plaintiff was considering withholding further payment 
to Mr. Mann under the Agreement. In response, Mr. Marin made at 
very clear to Mr. Bentley that his failure to satisfy his 
performance guarantee was the unavoidable result of plaintiff's 
failure to provide the promised marketing tools, that he could 
and would meet his performance guarantees when the tools were 
provided, and that he expected pJairtiff to continue making 
payment to him in accoidance with the terms of the Agreement. 
Mr. Bentley acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to perform as 
promised, represented that plaintiff anticipated that its website 
would be completed within aporoximately two weeks, and stated 
that plaintiff would be making a partial $15,000 payment to Mr. 
Marin. (R. 0124) 
18. On April 12, 2005, Mr. Marin spoke again witi Gary Young 
regarding plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing tools. 
Mr. Young responded by telling Mr. Marin that he would x'get to 
the bottom" of the problem and see what he could do. (R. 0124-
0123) 
19. Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to provide 
Mr. Marin with the marketing tools which he needed to do his job, 
and despite its requests for Mr. Marin to remain patient while it 
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contirued in its efforts to provide the marketing tools, 
plaintiff failed to pay Mr. Marin $10,000 of the advance payment 
due March 15, 2005 in accordance with paragraph 4 of the 
Agreement and failed to make any of the $25,000 advance payment 
due to be paid to Mr. Marin on April 15, 2005. (R. 0123) 
20. On April 26, 2005, Mr. Marin telephoned Mr Stirling 
regaraing plaintiff's failure to provide the promised marKet^ng 
tools. Mr. Stirling again assured Mr. Marin that they would be 
provided soon and again requested that Mr. Marin be patient. (R. 
0123) 
21. On May 3, 200^, Mr. Stilling notified Mr. Marin that he 
had received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e., vxJohn's 
folks") ''which indicated they are making progress" on the 
website. Mr. Stirling asked Mr. Marin to uhold tight." Thus, 49 
days after plaintiff stopped making payments to Mr. Marin in 
accordance with the Agreement, plaintiff acknowleaged that it had 
still not provided Mr. Marin with the marketing tools which were 
absolutely essential for him to be able to do his job and 
requested his continued patience. (R. 0123) 
22. On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still not 
provided any of the marketing tools which Mr. Marin needed in 
order to do his job, Mr. Marin spoke with Mr. Young and informed 
him that he believed he had been patient long enough in waiting 
for the repeatedly promised marketing tools and that he could no 
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longer afford to continue to his contractual relatiorship with 
plaintiff. (R. 0123-0122) 
23. The Complaint commencing this action was filed on July 
26, 2006. (R. 0023) Mr. Marin filed his Answer on December 15, 
2006 (R. 0057) and an Amended Answer on December 18, 2006. (R. 
0063) 
24. Plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on March 21, 2007. (R. 0105) Mr. Marin filed his Response to 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on April 4, 2007. (R. 0111) 
25. Following a hearing held October 1, 2007, the trial 
court issued its Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and denying Mr. Marin's Counter-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 0462) 
26. On May 27, 2008, plaintiff filed a Motion for Order of 
Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth 
and Sixth Cause of Action. (R. 0495) On that same date, 
plaintiff submitted a Proposed Final Judgment and an Affidavit of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (R. 0505) 
27. Mr. Marin served his Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed 
Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit on June 7, 2008. (R. 0499) 
28. On June 12, 2008, the trial court entereo a Final 
Judgment in which it awarded plaintiff $61,362.43 in compensatory 
damages and (despite the fact that this was a relatively simple 
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case in which neither party conducted any discovery and which was 
decided on summary judgment) awarded plaintiff $45,502.43 in 
costs and attorney fees. (R. 0505) 
29. Mr. Marin filed his Notice of Appeal on July 14, 2008. 
(R. 0514) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment based the undisputed fact that Mr. Marin 
failed to meet his "performance guarantees." In opposing 
plaintiff's motion, Mr. Marin does not deny that he failed to 
meet his performance guarantees. However, it is Mr. Marin's 
position that plaintiff's prior material breach of its obligation 
of good faith and fair dealing excused Mr. Marin from further 
performance under the Agreement. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Master 
Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994) (one party's 
material breach excuses the other party's further performance). 
Specifically, Mr. Marin contends that plaintiff's failure to 
provide him with the marketing tools which he needed in order to 
satisfy his performance guarantees constitutes a prior material 
breach of plaintiff's obligation to cooperate with Mr. Marin and 
to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified expectations and 
with the parties' agreed common purpose, thereby excusing Mr. 
Marin from his performance guarantees. See Rawson v. Conover, 
2001 UT 24, 1 44, 20 P.3d 876(a party must act consistently with 
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the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the 
other party); and PDQ Lube Center, Inc. V. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 
798 (Utah App. 1997) ("one party may not render it difficult or 
impossible for the other to continue performance and then take 
advantage of the nonperformance he has caused'') . 
The trial court abused its discretion in the amount of 
attorney fees awarded to plaintiff. This is a very simple breach 
of contract case in which neither party conducted any discovery 
and which was decided on summary judgment. Nevertheless, the 
trial court awarded plaintiff $43,903 in attorney foes. In 
determining the amount of a reasonable fee, a trial court may 
consider, inter alia, "the difficulty cf the litigation, [and] 
the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case...'' DIXJ e 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). Mr. Marin 
respectfully submits that if plaintiff spent the kind of time 
necessary to incur $43,903 in attorney fees, it did so 
inefficiently and Mr. Marin should not be required to pay for 
that kind of inefficiency. 
Additionally, a party requesting attorney fees is required 
to categorized the time and fees expended on successful claims 
for which fees may be awarded, unsuccessful claims for which fees 
might have been awarded if the claims had been successful, and 
claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees. 
Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 1132, 130 P. 3 325 (quoting Foote 
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v. Clark, 962 P.2d 54, 54 (Utah 1998). In the case at bar, 
plaintiff failed to categorized its fee request. 
Moreover, plaintiff was awarded thousands of dollars in 
attorney fees which it incurred in connection with: ''Defendant's 
Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of Order" and "Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider." However, plaintiff did not prevail on 
either matter (R. 392 & 448) and should, therefore, not be 
entitled to recover any attorney fees incurred in litigating 
them. See Gardner v. Madsen, 949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)(trial court should make adjustments to fee request so that 
the prevailing party "does not recover fees attributable to 
issues on which he did not prevail"). 
The trial court also abused its discretion in awarding 
plaintiff "costs" In the amount of $1,599.43, all but $235.00 of 
which were for photocopies, overnight mail, courier, postage, 
online research, etc. "Costs," as used in Rule 54(d)(1), URCP, 
means those fees which are required to be paid to the court and 
to witnesses, and which are authorized by statute to be included 
in a judgment. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
There is no statute which would authorize plaintiff to recover as 
costs its expenditures for "photocopies, overnight mail, courier, 
postage, and online research." 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
THERE IS AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF BREACHED 
ITS OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Whether there has been a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally 
inappropriate for decision as a matter of law. Republic Group, 
Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no disputed 
material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 
950, 953 (Utah 1998). "Because disposition of a case by summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt 
concerning questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor 
of the party opposing the motion." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson 
Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1988). 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is premised 
on Mr. Marin's breach of contract as alleged in the First Cause 
of Action set forth in plaintiff's Complaint. Specifically, 
plaintiff alleges that Mr. Marin breached the Agreement by 
failing to meet his ''performance guarantees." 
In opposing plaintiff's motion, Mr. Marin does not deny that 
he failed to meet his performance guarantees. However, it is Mr. 
Marin's position that plaintiff's failure to provide him with the 
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marketing tools which were necessary for him to satisfy his 
performance guarantees was a prior material breach of its 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing which excused Mr, Marin 
from further performance under the Agreement, and specifically 
excused him from his performance guarantees. See, e.g., Holbrook 
v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 
1994) (one party's material breach excuses the other party's 
further performance). 
Under Utah law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing inheres to all contractual relationships. See, e.g., 
Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, SI 44, 20 P. 3d 876. In order to 
comply with its obligation of good faith and fair dealing, 
"... a party must act consistently 'with the agreed common 
purpose and the justified expectations of the other party.' 
In analyzing for compliance with the covenant, both the 
contract language and the course of dealings between the 
parties should be considered to determine the parties' 
purpose, intentions, and expectations." 
Id. (citations omitted). Particularly applicable to the case at 
bar, this means that "one party may not render it difficult or 
impossible for the other to continue performance and then take 
advantage of the nonperformance he has caused." PDQ Lube Center, 
Inc. V. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 798 (Utah App. 1997)(quoting Zion's 
Properties, Inc. V. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975); see 
also Gregorson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 373 n.9 (Utah 1980) (xx... 
parties are obligated to cooperate with each other in good faith 
in the performance of a contract"); Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT 
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App 379, SI 18, 173 P.3d 865 (v\ . . one party may not render it 
difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and 
then take advantage of the non-performance he.has caused"); and 
17A Am Jur 2d Contracts § 370 (NX [W] henever the cooperation of the 
promissee is necessary for the performance of the promise, there 
is a condition implied that the cooperation will be given" ). 
In his Affidavit submitted in opposition to plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Mr. Marin offered the 
following testimony in support of his claim that plaintiff 
breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing: 
4. In order to induce me to enter into the Agreement, 
plaintiff represented to me that it was nearing completion 
of a new mainstream marketing website, recruiting DVD, audio 
CD, and other marketing materials (hereinafter referred to 
as the "marketing tools"). It was clearly understood by 
both plaintiff and myself that these marketing tools would 
be absolutely necessary in order for me to be able to meet 
my performance guarantees under the Agreement and it was 
represented to me that they would be available for "use by 
February 1, 2005. No experienced leader in this industry 
would agree to these performance guarantees without having 
these marketing tools. 
5. Unfortunately, while plaintiff repeatedly promised 
to do so, plaintiff failed to provide me with any of the 
necessary marketing tools (except for one mediocre but 
expensive brochure which my distributors were not interested 
in purchasing). After plaintiff's failure to provide the 
marketing tools by February 1, 2005, as promised, I spent 
more than a month working on my own and in conjunction with 
the third party vendor hired by plaintiff, Rainmaker 
Consulting Group, in order expedite the delivery of the 
marketing tools. I wrote more than 20 marketing and 
training scripts for video and web based content. On two 
occasions, I traveled to St. Augustine, Florida to work with 
Rainmaker Consulting shooting marketing videos. To my 
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knowledge, the videos have never been completed. 
6. It was only based upon plaintiff's representations 
and our mutual understanding that these marketing tools were 
almost ready and would be provided in a timely manner, that 
I agreed to the performance guarantees contained in 
paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement. Without the marketing tools 
there was virtually no possibility that I could have met the 
performance guarantees. 
7. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed 
to provide the marketing tools as promised, I contacted Gary 
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David 
Stirling, plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with my 
growing concerns about my ability to meet the performance 
guarantees. Mr. Young and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that 
plaintiff had failed to perform as promised, assured me that 
my inability to satisfy the performance guarantees would not 
affect my receipt of the advance payment of $25,000 due 
February 15, 2005, and expressed their confidence that the 
marketing tools would be ready for my use by mid-February to 
early March 2005. 
8. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley, 
plaintiff s Chief Financial Officer, informed me that due to 
my failure to meet the March 15, 2005 performance guarantee, 
plaintiff was considering withholding further payment to me 
under the Agreement. In response, I made it very clear to 
Mr. Bentley that my failure to satisfy the performance 
guarantee was the unavoidable result of plaintiff's failure 
to provide the promised marketing tools, that I could and 
would meet my performance guarantees when the tools were 
provided, and that I expected plaintiff to continue making 
payment to me in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. 
Mr. Bentley acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to 
perform as promised, represented that plaintiff anticipated 
that its website would be completed within approximately two 
weeks, and stated that plaintiff would be making a partial 
$15,000 payment to me. 
9. On April 12, 2005, I spoke again with Gary 'Young 
regarding plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing 
tools. Mr. Young responded by telling me that he would NNget 
to the bottom" of the problem and see what he could do. 
10. Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to 
provide me with the marketing tools which I needed to do my 
job, and despite its requests that I remain patient while it 
17 
continued in its efforts to provide the marketing tools, 
plaintiff failed to pay me $10,000 of the advance payment 
due March 15, 2005 in accordance writh paragraph 4 of the 
Agreement and failed to make any of the $25,000 advance 
payment due to be .paid to me on April'15, 2005. 
11. On April 26, 2005, I telephoned Mr. Stirling 
regarding plaintiff's failure to provide the promised 
marketing tools. Mr. Stirling again assured me that they 
would be provided soon and again requested my patience. 
12. On May 3, 2007, Mr. Stirling notified me that he 
had received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e., 
"John's folks) "which indicated they are making progress'' on 
the website. Mr. Stirling asked me to "hold tight". A copy 
of the e-mail is attached hereto. Thus, 49 cays after 
plaintiff stopped making payments to me m accordance with 
the Agreement, plaintiff acknowledged that it had still not. 
provided me with the marketing tools which were absoJutely 
essential for me to be able to do my job and again requested 
my continued patience. 
13. On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still 
not provided any of the marketing tools which I needed in 
order to do my job, I spoke with Mr. Young and informed him 
that I believed I had been patient long enough in waiting 
for the repeatedly promised marketing tools and that I could 
no longer afford to continue to my contractual relationship 
with plaintiff. 
(R. 0126-0122) 
Mr. Marin's respectfully submits that his testimony is 
sufficient to establish issues of fact as to whether plaintiff 
failed to act consistently with the parties' agreed upon common 
purpose of marketing and distributing plaintiff's product through 
a mainstream network marketing model, whether plaintiff failed to 
act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified expectation that 
plaintiff would provide Mr. Marin with the marketing tools 
necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy his performance 
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guarantees, and whether plaintiff made it difficult or impossible 
for Mr. Marin to meet his performance guarantees and is now 
attempting to take advantage of the non-performance which it 
caused. 
The trial court, however, rejected Mr. Marin's defense on 
the basis that N'[i]t is well settled that the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to impose new, 
independent duties in a written agreement."l The trial court 
also reasoned that the parol evidence rule barred the testimony 
which Mr. Marin offered to prove his claim. Mr. Marin 
respectfully submits that the trial court's conclusions are 
erroneous. 
(A) Mr. Marin is not attempting to impose new, independent 
duties into the parties' Agreement. 
The trial court was correct in recognizing that; " [ i ] t is 
well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing cannot be used to impose new, independent duties in a 
written agreement.'72 See Brown v. Moore, 973 P. 2d 950, 955 (Utah 
1998). However, it is equally well settled that a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing may result from an 
obligation, express or implied, which arises not from the 
language of the contract, but from the course of dealings and 
X(R. 456) 
2(R. 456) 
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conduct of the parties. Brown, supra, 973 P.2d at 954; St. 
Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P. 2d 194, 200 (Utah 
2001); and Myers, supra, 871 P.2d at 1048. 
In Brown, the Supreme Court of Utah explained that NN[i]n 
determining whether a party has breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, we are not limited to an examination of 
the express contractual provisions; we will also consider the 
course of dealing between the parties." 97 3 P.2d at 954 
(citations omitted)(emphasis added). The Brown plaintiffs nad 
purchased all of the stock of Western Heritage Thrift and Loan 
pursuant to an agreement which they entered into with the Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions (DFI). Because the 
plaintiffs were not infusing new capital sufficient to meet the 
minimum requirements under Utah law, NXDFI told plaintiffs that 
the necessary additional capital could be supplied by the Utah 
Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation's (ILGC) purchase of 
$2,000,000 of 'net worth certificates' from Western Heritage, 
which DFI would recognize as cash equivalents for accounting 
purposes in meeting capitalization requirements." 973 P.2d at 
952. Approximately two years later, the ILGC became insolvent 
and, as a consequence, Western Heritage became a failing 
depository institution because it was no longer able to use the 
net worth certificates in calculating its operating capital. 
Following DFI's seizure of Western Heritage due to its failure to 
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maintain adequate capital, the plaintiffs filed suit claiming, 
inter alia, that VXDFI breached the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by taking possession of Western Heritage before 
the lapse of a period sufficient to permit them to recover their 
investment. Plaintiffs assert [ed] that ... DFI was obligated to 
continue crediting the ILGC net v/orth certificates toward capital 
requirements imposed by State law." 973 P.2d at 954. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in DFI's favor and 
the Supreme Court affirmed, explaining the analytical framework 
for its decision as follows: 
In this case, an examination of the contract language 
reveals no express obligation on the part of DFI to allow 
plaintiffs to operate Western Heritage for a sufficient 
period to recoup their investment. Nor is there any 
language which guarantees that DFI will continue to count 
the net worth certificates toward capital requirements for 
any specific amount of time... Thus, if plaintiffs are to 
defeat summary judgment, the course of dealings between the 
parties must disclose some other obligation, express or 
implied, on the part of DFI which could give rise to a 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Id. Because the plaintiffs were unable to do so, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the summary judgment order: 
"Because no express or implied obligations of or 
representations by DFI indicated that DFI would recognize 
the net worth certificates regardless of the ILGC's 
finanical condition, DFI's eventual decision to discontinue 
doing so cannot form the basis of a breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. A contrary holding would 
^establish new,.independent rights or duties not agreed upon 
by the parties.'" 
973 P.2d at 955 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). 
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In short, the Brown court clearly recognized that a cause of 
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing may arise from obligations or representations, express or 
implied, which are not found in the language of the contract 
itself. See also, St. Benedicts Dev., supra, 811 P.2d at 200 -
(the Court examined the ''parties' conduct" in finding that the 
plaintiff had stated a claim for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing); and Myers, supra, 871 P.2d at 
1048 (parties' "course of dealings" failed to establish a breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
In the case at bar, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that his 
testimony regarding the parties' course of dealing and conduct is 
sufficient to establish issues of fact as to: (a) whether 
plaintiff failed to act consistently with the parties' agreed 
upon common purpose of marketing and distributing plaintiff s 
product through a mainstream network marketing model; (b) whether 
plaintiff failed to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified 
expectation that plaintiff would provide Mr. Marin with the 
marketing tools necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy 
his performance guarantees; and (c) whether plaintiff failed to 
cooperate in providing the necessary marketing tools thereby 
making it difficult or impossible for Mr. Marin to meet his 
performance guarantees and is now attempting to take advantage of 
the non-performance which it caused. 
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Because there is a dispute as to these material issues of 
fact, the trial court's Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment was improper and should he reversed. 
(B) The parol evidence rule is not implicated because the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres to 
all contractual relationships. 
The trial court also concluded that Mr. Marin's claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
''necessarily implicates the parol evidence rule. It is well 
settled that 'the [parol evidence] rule operates, in the 
absence of fraud of other invalidating causes, to exclude 
evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations, 
or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding 
to the terms of an integrated contract."3 
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that trial court's conclusion is 
erroneous. 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres m every 
contract. See, e.g., Markham v. Bradley, supra, 173 P.3d at 871. 
Because the covenant was already part of the contract at issue in 
this case, it follows that Mr. Marin's testimony in support of 
his claim for breach of the covenant was not ''offered for the 
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of" the contract. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that the parol 
evidence rule barred Mr. Marin's testimony. 
3(R. 456)(trial court's emphasis). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY 
FEES OF $43,903 IN THIS RELATIVELY SIMPLE BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CASE IN WHICH NEITHER PARTY CONDUCTED ANY DISCOVERY AND 
WHICH WAS DECIDED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court av/arded plaintiff attorney fees in the 
amount of $43,903. Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding such an excessive amount 
of fees. This is a very simple breach of contract case which was 
decided on summary judgment. Neither party conducted any 
discovery of any kind. 
Calculation of the amount of a reasonable attorney fee is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Dixie State Bank 
v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). In determining the 
amount of a reasonable fee, the trial court may consider, inter 
alia, NXthe difficulty of the litigation, [and] the efficiency of 
the attorneys in presenting the case..." Id. (quoting Cabrera v. 
Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983). This was not a 
difficult case. The only issue which the trial court was 
required to determine in order to grant summary judgment was 
whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
plaintiff's prior material breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing excused Mr. Marin's performance under the 
Agreement. This was a relatively simple issue which should have 
required very little attorney time to address. It certainly 
should not have required tens of thousands of dollars. 
Accordingly, if plaintiff did spend that kind of timer it did so 
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inefficiently and Mr. Marin should not be required to pay for 
that kind of inefficiency. 
Additionally, a party requesting attorney fees must 
"categorize the time and fees expended for ^successful 
claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney 
fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there may be an 
entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, 
and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney 
fees. ' " 
Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 5132, 130 P. 3 325 (quoting Foote 
v. Clark, 962 P.2d 54, 54 (Utah 1998). In the case at bar, 
plaintiff failed to categorized its fee request. (R. 0492) 
Moreover, plaintiff was awarded thousands of dollars for the 
attorney fees which it incurred in connection with: 
a. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of 
Order; and 
b. Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. 
However, plaintiff did not prevail on either matter (R. 392 & 
448) and should, therefore, not be entitled to recover any 
attorney fees incurred in litigating them. See Foote v. Clark, 
962 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 1998) ("the court should not reimburse 
counsel for time spent pursuing ungrounded and infeasible 
theories of recovery); and Gardner v. Madsenf 949 P.2d 785, 792 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (trial court should make adjustments to fee 
request so that the prevailing party "does not recover fees 
attributable to issues on which he did not prevail''). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING AS COSTS 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPENDITURES FOR PHOTOCOPIES, OVERNIGHT MAIL, 
COURIER, POSTAGE, ONLINE RESEARCH, ETC. 
The trial court also awarded plaintiff "costs" in the amount 
of $1,599.43. However, with the exceptions of its $155 filing 
fee and $80 service of process fee, the "costs" which plaintiff 
was awarded are not taxable ''costs" within the meaning of Rule 
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Ci\il Procedure. "Costs," as used 
in subdivision (d)(1), means those fees which are required to be 
paid to the court and to witnesses, and which are authorizeo by 
statute to be included in a judgment. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 
P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). There is no statute which would authorize 
plaintiff to recover as costs its expenditures for photocopies, 
overnight mail, courier, postage, and online research. 
Additionally, plaintiff's "Exhibit B Costs" lists two 
expenditures of $80 each and one expenditure for $130 which all 
represent that they are for "Marin service of process - Service 
of Process, Miami, Florida." Mr. Marin is unaware of any 
legitimate reason why three service of process charges would have 
been required. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Marin respectfully requests that 
the trial court's March 26, 2008 Order granting plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be reversed, that the Final 
Judgment be vacated, and that this case be remanded to the trial 
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court for further proceedings consistent with this Court's 
decision. . /1 
DATED t h i s ^ Vjay of March 2009. 
llant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Undersigned^certifies that two copies of the foregoing were 
mailed this 2 _ day of March 2009 via first class U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Barnard N. Madsen 
Scott D. Preston 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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Addendum 1 
Barnard N. Madsen (4626) 
Scott D.Preston (11019) 
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 426-8200 
Fax: 426-8208 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARLOS MARIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 060402237 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Division 1 
Plaintiff Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Plaintiff) is a Utah limited liability company. 
Defendant Carlos Marin ("Defendant") is an individual who resides in Miami, Florida. The 
matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment. 
I. Undisputed Material Facts 
The following undisputed facts are taken from the parties' pleadings with citations to the 
record omitted. 
FILED f 
Mart V. J 2008 
<• i - ' - 'STR ICT 
STPTZ. OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
A. Valid Contract 
After negotiations, Plaintiff, a Utah corporation, executed, a written agreement 
("Agreement") with Defendant on 12 January 2005. 
In their Agreement, Defendant expressly represented and warranted that he had 
"significant experience as a Distributor/Leader", had "numerous contacts with potential 
Distributor/Leaders" whom he could "bring to the Company and sign as new distributors with 
the Company", and had "successful, favorable experience in providing Services such as the 
duties as contemplated herein." 
Paragraph 18, the last paragraph of their Agreement directly above the signature blocks, 
is labeled "Entire Agreement" (underline in original) and states in part: "there are no 
representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in connection with the 
subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein." 
B. Plaintiffs Obligations 
Under paragraph 4 of their Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant advance 
payments of 
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005); 
$25,000 on 15 February 2005; 
$25,000 on 15 March 2005, and 
$25,000 on 15 April 2005. 
According to their Agreement, these advances and other specified performance bonuses 
were to help Defendant devote "all his time and attention into [sic] recruiting additional 
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distributors underneath him and training them" and were expressly intended "to entice 
[Defendant] to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary time to it. Also, [they] 
will provide him with a quick resource of cash to build the business." 
Under paragraphs 4 and 4.1, these advanced amounts were to be offset by any payments 
due Defendant for commissions and "Fast Cash" bonuses. 
Under paragraph 4.3, Plaintiff gave Defendant a product credit of $5,000 for January 
2005, and $5,000 for February 2005 "to be used for samples in attracting new 
Distributor/Leaders." 
C. Defendant's Obligations 
Under paragraph 3.3 of their Agreement, Defendant agreed to "devote his full time and 
attention to recruiting new Distributor/Leaders" to sell Plaintiffs products. 
Under paragraph 3.4 of their Agreement, Defendant agreed that he would meet the 
following performance guarantees of cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the specified dates: 
$5,000 by 15 February 2005; 
$30,000 by 15 March 2005; 
$100,000 by 15 April 2005; 
$300,000 by 15 May 2005; 
$600,000 by 15 June 2005, and 
$900,000 by 15 July 2005. 
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Paragraph 6.1 of their Agreement provides for Defendant's payment of Plaintiff s "loss 
and damage" and "legal fees" arising from "contravention . . . of any of the terms and conditions 
imposed on [Defendant] pursuant to this Agreement." 
D. Plaintiffs Performance and Defendant's Breach 
On 12 January 2005, in connection with the execution of their Agreement, Plaintiff paid 
Defendant a $25,000 advance. 
On 15 February 2005, Defendant met his $5,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales volume 
performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
Accordingly, on 15 February 2005, Plaintiff paid Defendant another $25,000 advance. 
On 15 March 2005, Defendant had failed to meet his $30,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales 
volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
On 15 March 2005, Plaintiff paid Defendant another $15,000 advance based on 
Defendant's representation that he would meet his 15 March 2005 performance guarantee of 
$30,000 in cumulative sales volume by 15 April 2005. 
On 15 April 2005, Defendant had failed to meet his 15 March 2005 $30,000 (let alone his 
15 April 2005 $100,000) cumulative "auto ship" sales volume performance guarantee under 
paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
Through June 2006, Defendant had generated a grand total of less than $36,000 in 
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume. 
E. Damages 
Plaintiff paid Defendant $65,000.00 in advances. 
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In 2005 and 2006, Defendant earned a total of $3,637.57 in commissions from Plaintiff. 
Defendant never earned "Fast Cash" bonus payments. 
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that the "monies advanced to [Defendant] will be 
offset by any payments due [Defendant] under the Fast Cash Program as calculated below. Also, 
these payments will be offset by any commission payments due [Defendant] each month as 
calculated by the standard commission payout plan. . . . If any of the advanced amounts are not 
repaid by the commission payouts or Fast Cash at the end of the guaranteed payments, these 
amounts will be deducted from any future commission payout. . . ." 
II. Discussion 
A. Legal Standards 
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
Rule 56; see also Billings ex. rel. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991). 
2. Contract Interpretation. "[Interpretation of a contract is a question of law." 
Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1983), citing Morris v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983). "A completely integrated 
agreement must be interpreted on its face." Ford v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 98 P.3d 15 f^ 
28 (Utah 2004). 
3. Material Breach Excuses Nonbreaching Party's Further Performance. "The law 
is well settled that a material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by 
the nonbreaching party." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 
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1994), dtmg, Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah App. 1992); Wright v. Westside 
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1990). 
4. Prejudgment Interest. Prejudgment interest may be recovered where the damage is 
complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and the loss is measurable by 
facts and figures. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). "Unless parties to a 
lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum." Utah Code Ana. 
§ 15-1-1 (2006). 
B. Elements of Proof for a Breach of Contract Claim 
To prevail on its breach of contract claim, Plaintiff must prove (1) a valid contract, (2) 
performance by Plaintiff, (3) breach by Defendant, and (4) damages. Bair v. Axiom Design, 
L.L.C., 20 P.3d 388, 392 ^ 14 (Utah 2001). 
Each of these elements is undisputed based on the parties' submissions. 
C, Defendant's Claims 
However, Defendant claims that his performance was excused because of Plaintiffs prior 
material breach of an oral term by failing to provide "marketing tools" by a purported deadline. 
Defendant also claims that his assertions concern a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. At oral argument, Defendant's counsel argued and directed the Court's attention to the 
Restatement of Contracts, Second § 216, and to FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 
P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1980) in support of Defendant's position that the contract was not 
completely integrated. 
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Defendant's claims are without merit. 
1. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Defendant's claim of Plaintiff s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is misplaced. It is well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
cannot be used to impose new, independent duties in a written agreement. Slicex, Inc. v. 
Aeroflex Colorado Springs. Inc.. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74234 n.l ('The implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing is 'implied in contracts "to protect the express covenants or promises 
of the contract.'" ... c[T]he doctrine of good faith and fair dealing does not serve to import new 
obligations into a contract. It merely controls how the obligations stated within the contract are to 
be performed.'"). 
2. The Parol Evidence Rule 
Defendant's claim that Plaintiff breached a purported oral term necessarily implicates the 
parol evidence rule. It is well settled that "the [parol evidence] rule operates, in the absence of 
fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous conversations, 
representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract." Hall v. Process Instruments & Control 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 
1995) (italics in original) citing inter alia Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah 
1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 213-14 (1981). 
Under the parol evidence rule, the Court must undertake a two-step analysis. First, is the 
parties' Agreement integrated? Second, did Defendant claim ambiguity or fraud? 
a. Is the Agreement integrated? "[B]efore considering the applicability of the parol 
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evidence rule in a contract dispute, the Court must first determine that the parties intended the 
writing to be an integration. To resolve this question of fact, any relevant evidence is 
admissible." Hall 890 P.2d at 1026. 
Based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court concludes as a 
preliminary matter that the parties intended their Agreement to be a complete integration and the 
final expression of their agreement. 
The Court's determination is based in part on the express integration provision directly 
over Defendant's signature in the Agreement itself which Defendant has neither disputed nor 
explained. Although not conclusive, the Court finds this express provision particularly 
persuasive. 
Further, the Agreement itself sets out in detail the rights and obligations of the parties, 
including various deadlines for their performance. It therefore begs the question: if, as 
Defendant contends, the purported term that Plaintiff breached was so critical to Defendant's 
performance, why was it not included in the parties' Agreement? 
Finally, the email communications between Defendant and Plaintiff submitted to the Court 
are devoid of any reference by Defendant to Plaintiffs breach of this purported critical term. 
The Court finds particularly persuasive an email exchange between Defendant and Plaintiffs 
general counsel on February 3, 2005, two days after the deadline Defendant contends that 
Plaintiff was to provide promised "marketing tools". Instead of complaining about how 
Plaintiffs recent breach would prevent his further performance, Defendant represented that he 
could expand Plaintiffs business into several foreign markets. Indeed, In the submissions before 
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the Court, there is no written notice of the purported breach to give Plaintiff the contractually-
required 10-day opportunity to cure. 
The Court notes that oral representations of additional terms have been accepted by other 
courts notwithstanding an integration clause in a written agreement. But those cases are most 
often in the context of a construction contract where the performance of the parties manifests 
their agreement or consent to "extras" beyond a written agreement. Therefore, those cases are 
distinguishable. 
Further, Defendant's assertions of Plaintiff s representations lack foundation as to the 
circumstances including who made the purported representation or representations and when 
such representations were made. 
In sum, based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court rejects 
Defendant's assertions that the parties intended to be bound by terms not found in their written 
Agreement and concludes as a threshold matter that the parties' Agreement was integrated. 
th Did Defendant claim ambiguity or fraud? 
Nowhere in his pleadings or submissions to this Court did Defendant claim that the parties' 
Agreement was ambiguous or that it was induced by fraud. On the contrary, he contended that 
the Agreement was a "valid contract" but that Plaintiff was the one who breached it. 
Thus, in the absence of any claim of fraud or ambiguity, Defendant's assertions offered for 
the purpose of adding to the terms of the parties' integrated Agreement must be excluded. Hall 
890 P.2d at 1026-27. 
As to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim involving a product credit Plaintiff provided to 
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Defendant, Defendant's order of product in excess of that credit, and the amount due to Plaintiff, 
the Court finds that there is a dispute as to the material facts. Therefore, the Court denies any 
relief to Plaintiff on that portion of its breach of contract claim at this point in the proceedings. 
Plaintiffs Remedy 
Based on the undisputed facts and as a matter of law (and pursuant to the parties' 
Agreement), Plaintiff is entitled to the difference between the advances it paid to Defendant 
($65,000.00) and the commissions Defendant earned ($3,637.57). Plaintiff is thus entitled to 
damages in the amount of $61,362.43. 
Because that damage amount was complete and fixed as of April 15, 2005 and is 
measurable by facts and figures, Plaintiff is also entitled to 10% prejudgment interest (simple no 
compounded) from April 15, 2005 through October 1, 2007, the date upon which the Court ruled 
that the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. 
Plaintiff is also entitled to post-judgment interest at the statutory rate commencing on the 
date this ordered is entered. 
Because Plaintiff is the prevailing party herein, it is entitled under the Pairties' Agreement 
to its attorney fees and costs. Since Plaintiff has outstanding claims that remain to be tried, the 
Court defers a ruling on the amount of Plaintiff s attorney fees and costs until the conclusion of 
the case and entry of a final judgment. 
[ THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ] 
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E. Conclusion 
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
GBAJSTTED in part and DEIHED in part, and Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
DATED this £-£> day of / w c H 2007. 
OV ' 
TEjE HONORABLE SAMUEL MCVEY 
v
 ' DISTMCT^OURT JUDGE 
v
-
4
«i'_J„>*1' 
Apppovedyas to form: 
S^ott^KMitcheU 
Attorney for Defendant 
£ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the ORDER to be faxed and 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this \IQ day of March, 2008, to the following: 
Scott B. Mitchell 
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC 
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Attorney for defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARLOS MARIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
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Case No. 060402237 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Division 1 
WHEREFORE, having heard oral arguments on this matter, having considered pleadings, 
prior orders and argument of counsel and pursuant to the Court's Order granting Plaintiffs 
motion for partial summary judgment consistent with the Court's ruling on October 1, 2007, the 
Court hereby enters judgment as follows: 
1. In favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the principle amount of $61,362.43. 
2. Prejudgment interest at 10% per year (simple not compounded) from April 15, 2005 
through October 1, 2007 in the amount of $15,128.48. ($6,136.24 per year; $16.80 per day for 
-JLr.L 
JUN i / m% 
4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
two (2) years and 170 days.) 
3. Post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of 5.42% from commencing March 26, 
2008, the date Judgment is entered. 
4. As the prevailing party and pursuant to the Parties' Agreement, Plainti ff is entitled to 
its attorney fees and costs in the amount of $45,502.43. (See Affidavit of Attorney Fees and 
Costs filed concurrently with this Proposed Final Judgment.) 
5. Total Judgment in the amount of $121,993.34. 
6. This Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's 
fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit, including the costs of appeal, pursuant to the contract at issue. 
DATED this / £ day of Jo t*e~ , 20Q8.„ 
< & • 
THE HONtyRApLE SAMUELJMCVEr 
DISTRICT i^OpRT J1IDGE -* 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the PROPOSED FINAL 
JUDGMENT to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this ^ / day of May, 2008, to the 
following: 
Scott B. Mitchell 
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC 
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Attorney for defendant 
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